📦 deps(thirdparty): update snapshots

This commit is contained in:
ci[bot]
2026-07-30 01:23:25 +00:00
parent 0c634043e3
commit a2904b069a
3368 changed files with 12954 additions and 9475 deletions
+154 -10
View File
@@ -44,6 +44,8 @@ function parseArgs(argv = process.argv.slice(2)) {
let skillsArg = null;
let versionInfo = false;
let dryRun = false;
let installAll = false;
let auditOnly = false;
let cursor = false,
claude = false,
gemini = false,
@@ -77,6 +79,10 @@ function parseArgs(argv = process.argv.slice(2)) {
dryRun = true;
continue;
}
if (a[i] === "--all") {
installAll = true;
continue;
}
if (a[i] === "--cursor") {
cursor = true;
continue;
@@ -106,6 +112,10 @@ function parseArgs(argv = process.argv.slice(2)) {
continue;
}
if (a[i] === "install") continue;
if (a[i] === "audit") {
auditOnly = true;
continue;
}
throw new Error(`Unknown option or command: ${a[i]}`);
}
@@ -119,6 +129,8 @@ function parseArgs(argv = process.argv.slice(2)) {
skillsArg,
versionInfo,
dryRun,
installAll,
auditOnly,
cursor,
claude,
gemini,
@@ -189,23 +201,26 @@ Options:
--category <csv> Install only skills matching these categories
--tags <csv> Install only skills matching these tags
--skills <csv> Set exact managed skill names, ids, or nested skill paths
--all Explicitly select the complete catalog, including offensive/unknown skills
--dry-run Preview installs/updates/removals for every target without writing
--version Print the installer version
--release <ver> Clone tag v<ver> (e.g. 4.6.0 -> v4.6.0)
--tag <tag> Clone this tag or branch (e.g. v4.6.0, main)
Examples:
npx agentic-awesome-skills
npx agentic-awesome-skills --cursor
npx agentic-awesome-skills --kiro
npx agentic-awesome-skills --antigravity
npx agentic-awesome-skills --agy
npx agentic-awesome-skills --skills brainstorming --dry-run
npx agentic-awesome-skills audit --skills brainstorming
npx agentic-awesome-skills --cursor --risk safe,none
npx agentic-awesome-skills --all --dry-run
npx agentic-awesome-skills --kiro --skills brainstorming
npx agentic-awesome-skills --antigravity --risk safe,none
npx agentic-awesome-skills --agy --skills brainstorming
npx agentic-awesome-skills --path .agents/skills --category development,backend --risk safe,none
npx agentic-awesome-skills --path .agents/skills --tags debugging,typescript-legacy-
npx agentic-awesome-skills --codex --skills frontend-design,game-development/2d-games --dry-run
npx agentic-awesome-skills --release 4.6.0
npx agentic-awesome-skills --path ./my-skills
npx agentic-awesome-skills --claude --codex Install to multiple targets
npx agentic-awesome-skills --release 4.6.0 --skills brainstorming
npx agentic-awesome-skills --path ./my-skills --skills brainstorming
npx agentic-awesome-skills --claude --codex --skills brainstorming
`);
}
@@ -271,6 +286,33 @@ function hasInstallSelectors(selectors) {
return Object.values(selectors).some(hasActiveSelector);
}
function assertExplicitInstallSelection(opts, selectors, requestedSkills) {
const hasSelection = hasInstallSelectors(selectors) || requestedSkills.length > 0;
if (opts.installAll && hasSelection) {
throw new Error("--all cannot be combined with --skills, --risk, --category, or --tags.");
}
if (opts.auditOnly && requestedSkills.length === 0) {
throw new Error("The audit command requires --skills with one or more exact skill ids.");
}
}
function buildRiskSummary(repoRoot, installEntries) {
const skillsRoot = path.join(repoRoot, "skills");
const summary = {};
for (const entry of installEntries.filter((item) => item !== "docs")) {
const risk = normalizeFilterValue(readSkill(skillsRoot, normalizeSourceEntry(entry)).risk) || "unclassified";
summary[risk] = (summary[risk] || 0) + 1;
}
return Object.fromEntries(Object.entries(summary).sort(([left], [right]) => left.localeCompare(right)));
}
function printImplicitFullInstallWarning(riskSummary) {
console.warn("\nWARNING: no skill selection was supplied, so the complete catalog will be installed for backward compatibility.");
console.warn(`Risk summary: ${Object.entries(riskSummary).map(([risk, count]) => `${risk}=${count}`).join(", ")}`);
console.warn("This can include offensive and unknown-risk skills. Prefer --skills, --risk, --category, or --tags.");
console.warn("Use audit --skills <ids> and --dry-run to inspect content and the write plan before installation.\n");
}
function matchesScalarSelector(value, selector) {
const normalized = normalizeFilterValue(value);
if (normalized && selector.exclude.includes(normalized)) {
@@ -501,6 +543,86 @@ function getInstallEntries(tempDir, selectors = buildInstallSelectors({}), reque
return entries;
}
const AUDIT_PATTERNS = [
["external-install", /\b(?:git\s+clone|npm\s+install|npx\s+|pip(?:3)?\s+install|brew\s+install|apt(?:-get)?\s+install|plugin\s+marketplace\s+add)\b/i],
["network", /\b(?:curl|wget|Invoke-WebRequest|irm\s+https?:\/\/|fetch\s*\(|https?:\/\/)\b/i],
["credential", /\b(?:api[_ -]?key|access[_ -]?token|secret|password|private[_ -]?key|wallet|seed phrase)\b/i],
["filesystem-write", /\b(?:cp|mv|rm|chmod|chown|mkdir|git\s+reset|Set-Content|Add-Content|Remove-Item)\b/i],
["privileged", /\b(?:sudo|runas|administrator|systemctl|launchctl)\b/i],
["destructive-or-irreversible", /\b(?:rm\s+-rf|git\s+reset\s+--hard|drop\s+(?:database|table)|broadcast(?:ing)?\s+(?:a\s+)?transaction|format\s+[A-Z]:)\b/i],
];
function listAuditFiles(rootDir) {
const files = [];
const walk = (current) => {
for (const entry of fs.readdirSync(current, { withFileTypes: true })) {
const entryPath = path.join(current, entry.name);
if (entry.isSymbolicLink()) {
files.push({ path: entryPath, symlink: true });
} else if (entry.isDirectory()) {
walk(entryPath);
} else if (entry.isFile()) {
files.push({ path: entryPath, symlink: false });
}
}
};
walk(rootDir);
return files;
}
function auditSkillEntries(repoRoot, installEntries) {
const skillsRoot = path.join(repoRoot, "skills");
return installEntries
.filter((entry) => entry !== "docs")
.map((entry) => {
const skillRoot = path.join(skillsRoot, normalizeSourceEntry(entry));
const findings = [];
for (const item of listAuditFiles(skillRoot)) {
const relativePath = path.relative(skillRoot, item.path).split(path.sep).join("/");
if (item.symlink) {
findings.push({ file: relativePath, line: null, categories: ["symlink"], text: "Symbolic link" });
continue;
}
const stats = fs.statSync(item.path);
if (stats.size > 1024 * 1024) {
findings.push({ file: relativePath, line: null, categories: ["large-unread-file"], text: `${stats.size} bytes` });
continue;
}
const buffer = fs.readFileSync(item.path);
if (buffer.includes(0)) {
findings.push({ file: relativePath, line: null, categories: ["binary-file"], text: `${stats.size} bytes` });
continue;
}
const lines = buffer.toString("utf8").split(/\r?\n/);
lines.forEach((line, index) => {
const categories = AUDIT_PATTERNS.filter(([, pattern]) => pattern.test(line)).map(([name]) => name);
if (categories.length > 0) {
findings.push({ file: relativePath, line: index + 1, categories, text: line.trim().slice(0, 240) });
}
});
}
return { skill: normalizeInstallEntry(entry), findings };
});
}
function printAuditReport(report, ref) {
console.log("\nStatic pre-install audit. No skill content was executed or installed.");
console.log(`Ref: ${ref || "default release"}`);
for (const skill of report) {
console.log(`\n${skill.skill}: ${skill.findings.length} review signal(s)`);
if (skill.findings.length === 0) {
console.log(" No command, network, credential, filesystem, privilege, binary, or symlink signals found.");
continue;
}
for (const finding of skill.findings) {
const location = finding.line ? `${finding.file}:${finding.line}` : finding.file;
console.log(` [${finding.categories.join(", ")}] ${location}`);
console.log(` ${finding.text}`);
}
}
console.log("\nReview every signal and every external source before installation. This static report is not a guarantee of safety.");
}
function installSkillsIntoTarget(tempDir, target, installEntries) {
const repoSkills = path.join(tempDir, "skills");
const selectedSkillEntries = new Set(
@@ -937,8 +1059,16 @@ function main() {
return;
}
const targets = getTargets(opts);
if (!targets.length || (!HOME && !opts.pathArg)) {
try {
assertExplicitInstallSelection(opts, selectors, requestedSkills);
} catch (error) {
console.error(`Error: ${error.message}`);
process.exitCode = 1;
return;
}
const targets = opts.auditOnly ? [] : getTargets(opts);
if (!opts.auditOnly && (!targets.length || (!HOME && !opts.pathArg))) {
console.error(
"Could not resolve home directory. Use --path <absolute-path>.",
);
@@ -966,6 +1096,15 @@ function main() {
return;
}
if (!opts.installAll && requestedSkills.length === 0 && !hasInstallSelectors(selectors)) {
printImplicitFullInstallWarning(buildRiskSummary(tempDir, installEntries));
}
if (opts.auditOnly) {
printAuditReport(auditSkillEntries(tempDir, installEntries), ref);
return;
}
// Preflight every target before mutating the first one. The same plan is
// printed for --dry-run and acts as the multi-target safety gate for apply.
let dryRunPlan;
@@ -1022,6 +1161,9 @@ module.exports = {
buildCloneArgs,
buildDryRunPlan,
buildDryRunTargetPlan,
assertExplicitInstallSelection,
auditSkillEntries,
buildRiskSummary,
buildInstallSelectors,
getInstallEntries,
getManagedEntries,
@@ -1037,6 +1179,8 @@ module.exports = {
parseSelectorArg,
printDryRunPlan,
parseArgs,
printImplicitFullInstallWarning,
printAuditReport,
pruneRemovedEntries,
readInstallManifest,
resolveExactSkillSelections,
@@ -41,7 +41,18 @@ LIMITATIONS_HEADING_PATTERNS = [
]
MARKDOWN_LINK_PATTERN = re.compile(r"\[[^\]]*\]\(([^)]+)\)")
DATE_PATTERN = re.compile(r"^\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}$")
SECURITY_DISCLAIMER_PATTERN = re.compile(r"AUTHORIZED USE ONLY", re.IGNORECASE)
SECURITY_DISCLAIMER_PATTERN = re.compile(
r"> \*\*⚠️ AUTHORIZED USE ONLY\*\*\s*\n"
r"> This skill is for educational purposes or authorized security assessments only\.\s*\n"
r"> You must have explicit, written permission from the system owner before using this tool\.\s*\n"
r"> Misuse of this tool is illegal and strictly prohibited\.",
)
OFFENSIVE_CONFIRMATION_PATTERN = re.compile(
r"Mandatory confirmation gate[\s\S]{0,900}"
r"exact target URL, IP, account, or resource[\s\S]{0,900}"
r"Wait for explicit confirmation in the current conversation",
re.IGNORECASE,
)
VALID_RISK_LEVELS = {"none", "safe", "critical", "offensive", "unknown"}
DEFAULT_MARKDOWN_TOP_FINDINGS = 15
DEFAULT_MARKDOWN_TOP_SKILLS = 20
@@ -244,6 +255,14 @@ def build_skill_report(
"Offensive skill is missing the required 'AUTHORIZED USE ONLY' disclaimer.",
)
)
if risk == "offensive" and not OFFENSIVE_CONFIRMATION_PATTERN.search(content):
findings.append(
Finding(
"error",
"missing_offensive_confirmation_gate",
"Offensive skill is missing the mandatory target, authorization, command preview, and explicit confirmation gate.",
)
)
return finalize_skill_report(
rel_dir,
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ from git_change_records import (
ChangeRecord,
list_tree,
materialize_tree,
read_blob,
read_change_records,
read_path,
resolve_commit,
@@ -118,11 +119,14 @@ def canonical_skill_id(path: str | None, roots: set[str]) -> str | None:
if path is None or not path.startswith("skills/"):
return None
relative = path[len("skills/") :]
candidates = [
root
for root in roots
if relative == f"{root}/SKILL.md" or relative.startswith(f"{root}/")
]
parts = relative.split("/")
candidates = []
for end in range(1, len(parts)):
root = "/".join(parts[:end])
if root in roots and (
relative == f"{root}/SKILL.md" or relative.startswith(f"{root}/")
):
candidates.append(root)
return max(candidates, key=lambda root: (root.count("/"), len(root))) if candidates else None
@@ -275,6 +279,44 @@ def evaluate_snapshot(snapshot_root: Path, skill_id: str) -> dict[str, object]:
}
def materialize_skill_snapshot(
repo: Path,
commit_oid: str,
skill_id: str,
snapshot_root: Path,
) -> list[dict[str, str]]:
"""Materialize a skill, parsing a legacy executable SKILL.md as inert data.
The generic tree helper intentionally rejects every executable blob. Some
historical canonical SKILL.md files nevertheless use mode 100755. Reading
that exact documentation blob into a private 0600 file lets the evidence
evaluator compare before/after metadata without executing it or admitting
any other unsafe tree entry.
"""
skill_root = snapshot_root / "skills" / skill_id
unsafe = materialize_tree(
repo,
commit_oid,
f"skills/{skill_id}",
skill_root,
)
skill_file = skill_root / "SKILL.md"
if not skill_file.exists():
expected_path = f"skills/{skill_id}/SKILL.md"
legacy_entry = next(
(
entry
for entry in unsafe
if entry["path"] == expected_path and entry["mode"] == "100755"
),
None,
)
if legacy_entry is not None:
skill_file.write_bytes(read_blob(repo, legacy_entry["oid"]))
skill_file.chmod(0o600)
return unsafe
def _audit_severities(snapshot: dict[str, object] | None) -> dict[str, list[str]]:
severities: dict[str, list[str]] = defaultdict(list)
if not snapshot:
@@ -454,12 +496,12 @@ def build_report(
after_unsafe: list[dict[str, str]] = []
if base_exists and old_id:
before_root = temp_root / f"{index}-before"
before_unsafe = materialize_tree(root, base_oid, f"skills/{old_id}", before_root / "skills" / old_id)
before_unsafe = materialize_skill_snapshot(root, base_oid, old_id, before_root)
if (before_root / "skills" / old_id / "SKILL.md").is_file():
before = evaluate_snapshot(before_root, old_id)
if head_exists and new_id:
after_root = temp_root / f"{index}-after"
after_unsafe = materialize_tree(root, head_oid, f"skills/{new_id}", after_root / "skills" / new_id)
after_unsafe = materialize_skill_snapshot(root, head_oid, new_id, after_root)
if (after_root / "skills" / new_id / "SKILL.md").is_file():
after = evaluate_snapshot(after_root, new_id)
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ const DISALLOWED_COAUTHOR_TRAILER_PATTERNS = [
];
const FULL_SHA_PATTERN = /^[0-9a-f]{40}$/u;
const EVIDENCE_SCHEMA_VERSION = 1;
const EVIDENCE_TIMEOUT_MS = 120_000;
const EVIDENCE_TIMEOUT_MS = 300_000;
const MAX_EVIDENCE_BYTES = 8 * 1024 * 1024;
const APPROVAL_WORKFLOW_PATHS = new Set([
".github/workflows/actionlint.yml",
@@ -1314,6 +1314,7 @@ if (require.main === module) {
}
module.exports = {
EVIDENCE_TIMEOUT_MS,
approvalWorkflowPaths: APPROVAL_WORKFLOW_PATHS,
approveActionRequiredRuns,
approveWorkflowRun,
@@ -99,6 +99,12 @@ const eclEnvironmentGuide = fs.readFileSync(
'utf8',
);
const lovableCleanupSkill = fs.readFileSync(path.join(repoRoot, 'skills', 'lovable-cleanup', 'SKILL.md'), 'utf8');
const blueprintSkill = fs.readFileSync(path.join(repoRoot, 'skills', 'blueprint', 'SKILL.md'), 'utf8');
const uiUpdateSkill = fs.readFileSync(path.join(repoRoot, 'skills', 'ui-update', 'SKILL.md'), 'utf8');
const xTwitterScraperSkill = fs.readFileSync(path.join(repoRoot, 'skills', 'x-twitter-scraper', 'SKILL.md'), 'utf8');
const agentMemoryMcpSkill = fs.readFileSync(path.join(repoRoot, 'skills', 'agent-memory-mcp', 'SKILL.md'), 'utf8');
const speckitUpdaterSkill = fs.readFileSync(path.join(repoRoot, 'skills', 'speckit-updater', 'SKILL.md'), 'utf8');
const securityAntivirusGuide = fs.readFileSync(path.join(repoRoot, 'docs', 'users', 'security-and-antivirus.md'), 'utf8');
function fencedBlocks(content, language) {
const blocks = [];
@@ -522,6 +528,21 @@ assert.match(
/react-native-keychain|expo-secure-store/,
'React Native reference should direct token storage to platform-backed secure storage',
);
for (const [name, content] of [
['blueprint', blueprintSkill],
['ui-update', uiUpdateSkill],
['x-twitter-scraper', xTwitterScraperSkill],
['agent-memory-mcp', agentMemoryMcpSkill],
]) {
assert.match(content, /checkout --detach [0-9a-f]{40}/, `${name} must pin its reviewed external source`);
assert.match(content, /mktemp -d/, `${name} must review external content outside active skill paths`);
assert.match(content, /explicit (?:user )?approval/i, `${name} must require approval before activation`);
}
assert.doesNotMatch(uiUpdateSkill, /git reset --hard|Always safe \(do without asking\)|safe and reversible/i);
assert.doesNotMatch(speckitUpdaterSkill, /C:\\Users\\bobby/i);
assert.match(securityAntivirusGuide, /does not itself run/i);
assert.match(securityAntivirusGuide, /does not prove safety/i);
assert.match(securityAntivirusGuide, /evidence of execution/i);
for (const scriptName of ['generate_slides.py', 'create_pdf_slides.py']) {
const helpRun = spawnSync(
@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ const exactPreview = installer.parseArgs([
]);
assert.strictEqual(exactPreview.skillsArg, 'frontend-design,game-development/2d-games');
assert.strictEqual(exactPreview.dryRun, true);
assert.strictEqual(installer.parseArgs(['--all', '--dry-run']).installAll, true);
assert.strictEqual(installer.parseArgs(['audit', '--skills', 'frontend-design']).auditOnly, true);
assert.deepStrictEqual(
installer.parseExactSkillArg(exactPreview.skillsArg),
['frontend-design', 'game-development/2d-games'],
@@ -40,3 +42,20 @@ assert.doesNotMatch(version.stdout, /Cloning repository/i);
const invalid = spawnSync(process.execPath, [installerPath, '--unknown'], { encoding: 'utf8' });
assert.notStrictEqual(invalid.status, 0);
assert.match(invalid.stderr, /unknown option/i);
assert.throws(
() => installer.assertExplicitInstallSelection(
installer.parseArgs(['--all', '--skills', 'frontend-design']),
installer.buildInstallSelectors({}),
['frontend-design'],
),
/--all cannot be combined/i,
);
assert.throws(
() => installer.assertExplicitInstallSelection(
installer.parseArgs(['audit']),
installer.buildInstallSelectors({}),
[],
),
/audit command requires --skills/i,
);
@@ -203,3 +203,27 @@ withTempDir((root) => {
"a nested skill that does not match filters must not leak into the installation",
);
});
withTempDir((root) => {
const repoRoot = path.join(root, "repo");
fs.mkdirSync(path.join(repoRoot, "skills"), { recursive: true });
fs.mkdirSync(path.join(repoRoot, "docs"), { recursive: true });
writeSkill(
repoRoot,
"audited-skill",
'name: audited-skill\ncategory: testing\nrisk: unknown\ntags: [audit]',
);
fs.appendFileSync(
path.join(repoRoot, "skills", "audited-skill", "SKILL.md"),
"\n```bash\ngit clone https://example.com/tool.git /tmp/tool\nrm -rf /tmp/tool\n```\n",
);
const report = installer.auditSkillEntries(repoRoot, ["audited-skill", "docs"]);
assert.strictEqual(report.length, 1);
assert.strictEqual(report[0].skill, "audited-skill");
assert.ok(report[0].findings.some((finding) => finding.categories.includes("external-install")));
assert.ok(report[0].findings.some((finding) => finding.categories.includes("destructive-or-irreversible")));
assert.deepStrictEqual(
installer.buildRiskSummary(repoRoot, ["audited-skill", "docs"]),
{ unknown: 1 },
);
});
@@ -8,6 +8,12 @@ const HEAD_SHA = "2".repeat(40);
const BLOB_SHA = "3".repeat(40);
const ZERO_SHA = "0".repeat(40);
assert.strictEqual(
mergeBatch.EVIDENCE_TIMEOUT_MS,
300_000,
"repository-wide trusted evidence must have a five-minute execution budget",
);
function makeCheckRun(name, status, conclusion, startedAt, id, suiteId = 1) {
return {
name,
@@ -209,3 +209,10 @@ test("canonical security fixes are synchronized to distributed plugin mirrors",
);
}
});
test("BrowserAct never delegates its operating policy to mutable provider guides", () => {
const skill = read("skills/browser-act/SKILL.md");
assert.doesNotMatch(skill, /^browser-act get-skills\b/m);
assert.match(skill, /checked-in Skill remains the complete operating policy/);
assert.match(skill, /browser-act <subcommand> --help/);
});
@@ -96,6 +96,23 @@ def init_repo(*, with_skill: bool = True) -> tuple[Path, str]:
class ChangedSkillEvidenceTests(unittest.TestCase):
def test_canonical_skill_lookup_checks_only_path_ancestors(self):
class NonIterableRoots(set):
def __iter__(self):
raise AssertionError("canonical lookup must not scan every skill root")
roots = NonIterableRoots({"parent", "parent/child", "unrelated"})
self.assertEqual(
changed_skill_evidence.canonical_skill_id(
"skills/parent/child/references/example.md", roots
),
"parent/child",
)
self.assertIsNone(
changed_skill_evidence.canonical_skill_id("docs/example.md", roots)
)
def test_mixed_copy_and_rename_keep_distinct_change_types(self):
root, base = init_repo()
original = root / "skills/example/SKILL.md"
@@ -150,6 +167,30 @@ class ChangedSkillEvidenceTests(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertTrue(any("unsafe_snapshot_regression:100755:run.sh" in reason for reason in report["reasons"]))
def test_legacy_executable_skill_markdown_can_be_normalized_and_compared(self):
root, _ = init_repo()
path = root / "skills/example/SKILL.md"
os.chmod(path, 0o755)
git(root, "add", ".")
git(root, "commit", "-m", "legacy executable skill markdown")
base = git(root, "rev-parse", "HEAD")
path.write_text(
path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").replace("risk: safe", "risk: critical"),
encoding="utf-8",
)
os.chmod(path, 0o644)
git(root, "add", ".")
git(root, "commit", "-m", "normalize skill markdown")
report = changed_skill_evidence.build_report(root, base, "HEAD")
change = report["changes"][0]
self.assertIsNotNone(change["before"])
self.assertIsNotNone(change["after"])
self.assertEqual(change["before"]["risk"]["declared"], "safe")
self.assertEqual(change["after"]["risk"]["declared"], "critical")
self.assertFalse(change["blocking"])
def test_skill_markdown_replaced_by_gitlink_is_not_treated_as_deletion(self):
root, base = init_repo()
git(root, "rm", "skills/example/SKILL.md")
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
import importlib.util
import pathlib
import unittest
REPO_ROOT = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parents[3]
SCRIPT_DIR = REPO_ROOT / "skills" / "find-complementary-founders" / "scripts"
def load_module(name: str, filename: str):
spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(name, SCRIPT_DIR / filename)
if spec is None or spec.loader is None:
raise RuntimeError(f"Cannot load {filename}")
module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
spec.loader.exec_module(module)
return module
PUBLISHER = load_module("findmate_moltbook_publish_test", "moltbook_publish.py")
GITHUB_THREAD = load_module("findmate_github_thread_test", "github_thread.py")
COMMIT = "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef01234567"
IMMUTABLE_URL = (
f"https://github.com/owner/repo/blob/{COMMIT}/profiles/owner-profile.public.json"
)
class FindMateProfileUrlTests(unittest.TestCase):
def test_accepts_full_sha_pinned_github_blob(self):
self.assertEqual(
PUBLISHER.immutable_github_profile_url(IMMUTABLE_URL),
IMMUTABLE_URL,
)
body = f"Owner-approved profile: {IMMUTABLE_URL}"
self.assertEqual(GITHUB_THREAD.safe_profile_url(body), IMMUTABLE_URL)
def test_rejects_mutable_or_non_github_profile_urls(self):
invalid_urls = [
"https://github.com/owner/repo/blob/main/owner-profile.public.json",
f"https://example.com/owner/repo/blob/{COMMIT}/owner-profile.public.json",
f"https://github.com/owner/repo/blob/{COMMIT}/owner-profile.public.json?raw=1",
f"https://github.com/owner/repo/blob/{COMMIT}/profiles/../owner-profile.public.json",
]
for url in invalid_urls:
with self.subTest(url=url):
with self.assertRaises(PUBLISHER.PublishError):
PUBLISHER.immutable_github_profile_url(url)
self.assertIsNone(
GITHUB_THREAD.safe_profile_url(
f"Owner-approved profile: {url}"
)
)
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
import importlib.util
import sys
import tempfile
import unittest
from pathlib import Path
REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[3]
TOOLS_SCRIPTS_DIR = REPO_ROOT / "tools" / "scripts"
if str(TOOLS_SCRIPTS_DIR) not in sys.path:
sys.path.insert(0, str(TOOLS_SCRIPTS_DIR))
def load_module(relative_path: str, name: str):
spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(name, REPO_ROOT / relative_path)
module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
assert spec.loader is not None
spec.loader.exec_module(module)
return module
validate_skills = load_module("tools/scripts/validate_skills.py", "validate_skills_offensive_guardrails")
EXACT_GUARDRAIL = """
> **⚠️ AUTHORIZED USE ONLY**
> This skill is for educational purposes or authorized security assessments only.
> You must have explicit, written permission from the system owner before using this tool.
> Misuse of this tool is illegal and strictly prohibited.
> **Mandatory confirmation gate**
> Before running any command that probes, exploits, changes, persists on, extracts data from, or attempts credential access against a target:
> 1. Ask the user to state the exact target URL, IP, account, or resource.
> 2. Ask the user to confirm written authorization and the permitted scope.
> 3. Show the exact command(s) and explain their expected effect.
> 4. Wait for explicit confirmation in the current conversation.
"""
def write_skill(root: Path, body: str):
skill_dir = root / "offensive-test"
skill_dir.mkdir(parents=True)
(skill_dir / "SKILL.md").write_text(
"---\n"
"name: offensive-test\n"
"description: Test an authorized offensive workflow.\n"
"risk: offensive\n"
"source: self\n"
"date_added: \"2026-07-29\"\n"
"---\n\n"
f"{body}\n\n"
"## When to Use\n\n- Authorized tests only.\n",
encoding="utf-8",
)
class OffensiveSkillGuardrailTests(unittest.TestCase):
def test_generic_disclaimer_without_confirmation_fails(self):
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
skills_dir = Path(tmp) / "skills"
write_skill(skills_dir, "> AUTHORIZED USE ONLY: authorized tests only.")
results = validate_skills.collect_validation_results(str(skills_dir))
self.assertTrue(any("EXACT AUTHORIZED-USE DISCLAIMER" in error for error in results["errors"]))
self.assertTrue(any("PER-ACTION CONFIRMATION GATE" in error for error in results["errors"]))
def test_exact_guardrail_passes_security_checks(self):
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
skills_dir = Path(tmp) / "skills"
write_skill(skills_dir, EXACT_GUARDRAIL)
results = validate_skills.collect_validation_results(str(skills_dir))
self.assertFalse(any("OFFENSIVE SKILL" in error for error in results["errors"]))
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
@@ -87,7 +87,18 @@ def collect_validation_results(skills_dir, strict_mode=False):
skill_count = 0
# Pre-compiled regex
security_disclaimer_pattern = re.compile(r"AUTHORIZED USE ONLY", re.IGNORECASE)
security_disclaimer_pattern = re.compile(
r"> \*\*⚠️ AUTHORIZED USE ONLY\*\*\s*\n"
r"> This skill is for educational purposes or authorized security assessments only\.\s*\n"
r"> You must have explicit, written permission from the system owner before using this tool\.\s*\n"
r"> Misuse of this tool is illegal and strictly prohibited\.",
)
offensive_confirmation_pattern = re.compile(
r"Mandatory confirmation gate[\s\S]{0,900}"
r"exact target URL, IP, account, or resource[\s\S]{0,900}"
r"Wait for explicit confirmation in the current conversation",
re.IGNORECASE,
)
valid_risk_levels = ["none", "safe", "critical", "offensive", "unknown"]
date_pattern = re.compile(r'^\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}$') # YYYY-MM-DD format
@@ -183,7 +194,9 @@ def collect_validation_results(skills_dir, strict_mode=False):
# 4. Security Guardrails
if metadata.get("risk") == "offensive":
if not security_disclaimer_pattern.search(content):
errors.append(f"🚨 {rel_path}: OFFENSIVE SKILL MISSING SECURITY DISCLAIMER! (Must contain 'AUTHORIZED USE ONLY')")
errors.append(f"🚨 {rel_path}: OFFENSIVE SKILL MISSING THE EXACT AUTHORIZED-USE DISCLAIMER")
if not offensive_confirmation_pattern.search(content):
errors.append(f"🚨 {rel_path}: OFFENSIVE SKILL MISSING THE MANDATORY PER-ACTION CONFIRMATION GATE")
# 5. Dangling Links Validation
# Look for markdown links: [text](href)