📦 deps(thirdparty): update snapshots

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ci[bot]
2026-06-29 16:09:10 +00:00
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# Pre-release Review Checklist
Use this checklist to find production release risks from a PR or git diff. Report only categories
with confirmed problems or plausible risks that need confirmation.
## Database and data changes
- Schema or ORM model changes without corresponding migration files.
- New columns, enums, constraints, indexes, partitions, triggers, functions, or extensions that need
deploy-time DDL.
- Destructive migrations, column renames, type changes, constraint tightening, or data rewrites
without backward-compatible rollout or rollback notes.
- New required data without seed, backfill, admin setup, or one-time SQL.
- Index changes that may lock large tables or need concurrent/online creation.
- Query changes that depend on data shape not guaranteed in production.
- Migration files present but not referenced by the deploy system or migration runner.
## Environment and configuration
- New env var, config key, feature flag, secret name, or runtime option without example/default,
deployment platform update, or CI/CD secret update.
- Config key rename/removal that may break existing production variables.
- Code that reads production-only values without validation or safe failure behavior.
- Feature flags without documented default state, owner, rollout plan, or kill switch.
- Docker, Kubernetes, Helm, Terraform, Railway, Vercel, GitHub Actions, or similar deploy config
changes that require manual environment changes.
## Security and sensitive material
- Private keys, tokens, passwords, certificates, cookies, `.pem`, `.key`, `.p12`, `.env`, service
account JSON, or cloud credentials added to the diff.
- Logs, errors, analytics, webhooks, or traces that may expose PII, tokens, session IDs, or payment
data.
- Debug endpoints, admin bypasses, permissive CORS, disabled auth, relaxed TLS, or temporary
development flags.
- IAM, ACL, bucket policy, database role, queue permission, webhook signature, or API key scope
changes without release coordination.
- Dependency or container changes with known security-sensitive behavior, native binaries, or
postinstall scripts.
## Cache, CDN, and derived state
- Redis key format, namespace, TTL, serialization, or value shape changes without invalidation or
backward compatibility.
- Code that assumes warmed cache, precomputed data, materialized views, search indexes, or derived
tables exist.
- CDN/static asset paths, cache headers, ETags, versioning, or purge requirements changed.
- Rollout can serve mixed old/new cache values during a partial deploy.
- Feature removal leaves stale cache keys that can revive old behavior.
## Queues, events, and schedulers
- New topic, queue, routing key, exchange, subscription, event type, cron job, or scheduled worker.
- Producer and consumer contract changes without compatible deployment order.
- Missing DLQ, retry policy, idempotency, dedupe key, or poison-message handling.
- Worker concurrency, timeout, rate limit, or backpressure changes that may overload dependencies.
- Event payload shape changes without versioning or old-consumer compatibility.
## External services and assets
- New object storage, CDN, S3, OSS, GCS, or static asset references without upload or permissions
confirmation.
- Email, SMS, push, PDF, image, translation, or notification templates changed without production
material update.
- Webhook URL, callback domain, redirect URI, CORS origin, OAuth app, payment provider, or third
party whitelist changes.
- New cloud resource, bucket, DNS record, certificate, API product, SaaS setting, or quota need.
- Frontend build assets depend on backend routes or config that are not deployed yet.
## Service dependencies and deployment order
- API contract changes affecting web, mobile, workers, indexers, schedulers, or third parties.
- Database migration must run before or after specific service versions.
- Worker should be paused, drained, or deployed after producers.
- Read/write compatibility risks during rolling deploys.
- New background jobs, queues, or cache consumers need infrastructure before application deploy.
- Rollback would be unsafe because schema, data, cache, or queue payloads are not backward
compatible.
## CI/CD and release automation
- Workflow, Dockerfile, build script, deploy script, package manager, lockfile, or artifact path
changed.
- Required build-time env var, secret, binary, system package, or runtime version changed.
- Tag/release workflow depends on files or outputs not updated in the diff.
- Migration, seed, asset upload, or cache purge step is manual but not documented.
- Tests, linters, or type checks disabled or narrowed for release-critical code.
## Observability and operations
- New critical path without logs, metrics, traces, health checks, dashboards, or alerts.
- Error handling changed without actionable logs or rollback signal.
- Runbook, release checklist, incident response, or support notes missing for operational changes.
- Kill switch, feature flag, or emergency disable path absent for risky functionality.
- SLO, rate limit, quota, or capacity implication not addressed.
## Reportable "unable to verify" cases
- Remote PR diff cannot be fetched.
- Release tag cannot be found and the audit fell back to recent commits.
- Deployment platform config, production secrets, cloud buckets, queues, or external SaaS settings
are not accessible from the local repository.
- Owner cannot be inferred from blame/log evidence.
- Diff is too large to inspect fully within the available time or tool limits.
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# Pre-release Review Report Template
Use this template for the final report. Translate headings to the user's language if useful, but
keep the same sections, priority labels, conclusion values, and finding fields.
## Priority definitions
- `P0` - Block release. A production deploy is likely to fail, corrupt data, expose secrets, break
compatibility, or require a missing manual action.
- `P1` - High risk, must confirm before release. Evidence suggests a production dependency,
migration, config, cache, queue, asset, or service-order risk.
- `P2` - Medium risk or ambiguous gap. Not clearly blocking, but should be checked before release
because the diff introduces uncertainty.
- `P3` - Low-risk note. Do not include P3 in the main report unless the user asks for a complete
audit log.
## Conclusion values
- `BLOCKED` - At least one P0 finding exists.
- `NEEDS_CONFIRMATION` - No P0 was found, but one or more P1/P2 items need confirmation.
- `NO_BLOCKER_FOUND` - No P0-P2 finding or release confirmation item was found from available
evidence. Neutral verification limits may still be listed separately.
## Findings versus Unable To Verify
- Put diff-linked production risks in `Findings`. Examples: a new env var whose production value
cannot be verified, a schema change with unclear migration execution, or a new queue whose
infrastructure is not confirmed.
- Any P1 or P2 finding means the conclusion is `NEEDS_CONFIRMATION` unless a P0 makes it `BLOCKED`.
- Put only neutral tool or access limits in `Unable To Verify`. Examples: remote PR access is
unavailable, deployment platform access is unavailable, or owner inference failed without a
specific release-critical change.
- If an access/tool limitation prevents confirmation of a release-critical diff change, promote it
to a P1/P2 finding instead of leaving it only in `Unable To Verify`.
## Owner inference
- Prefer `git blame` on changed lines for the file and line that caused the finding.
- If blame is unavailable or misleading, use `git log --format="%h %an %s" -- <path>`.
- If several commits contributed to the same release risk, list all relevant author names.
- Mark owners as "inferred" and do not expose email addresses.
- If no owner can be inferred, write `Unknown (not inferable from local git evidence)`.
## Secret redaction
- Never print secret values, even partially, unless the value is already a harmless placeholder such
as `example`, `changeme`, or `REDACTED`.
- Report secrets as: path, line, variable/key name, type, and redacted hint.
- Example: `config/prod.env:12` - `PAYMENT_API_KEY`, suspected API key, value redacted.
- Do not paste PEM blocks, JWTs, cookies, session IDs, private keys, passwords, certificates, or
cloud credentials into the report.
## Final report shape
```markdown
# Production Release Readiness Review
## Scope
- Range: <base>..<head> | PR <number> | latest 5 commits fallback
- Current branch: <branch>
- Head commit: <hash>
- Compared from: <tag/hash/pr-base>
- Commit count: <count>
- Dirty worktree: <yes/no and short note>
- Commands used: <short list of read-only commands>
## Conclusion
`BLOCKED` | `NEEDS_CONFIRMATION` | `NO_BLOCKER_FOUND`
## Findings
| Priority | Module | Finding | Evidence | Inferred owner | Risk | Recommended action |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| P0/P1/P2 | <area/service> | <short issue> | <file:line or commit/range> | <name(s) or unknown> | <why it matters> | <release action> |
## Deployment Order / Release Actions
- <Only include when relevant. State service order, migrations, queue/cache/resource actions, and compatibility constraints.>
## Unable To Verify
- <Tooling, auth, remote, production-config, or repository limits that prevent confirmation.>
```
## Finding writing rules
- Keep each finding actionable and short.
- Include only P0-P2 or explicit confirmation risks.
- Do not include clean categories like "database OK" or "security OK".
- Use evidence-driven wording: "schema changed but no migration file changed" is better than
"maybe migration missing".
- If risk is ambiguous, say exactly what must be confirmed before release.
- If no findings exist, omit the `Findings` table and write:
`No P0-P2 release blockers or confirmation items were found from the available repository evidence.`